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THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE
UNITED NATIONS

November 22, 1962

Dear Mr. President:

I have expressed my views in detail to Jack McCloy, and can be reached at Ridgeland, South Carolina (Code 803 Tel: 726-8237). I can return, if another drafter is needed, on short notice, and in any event will be in New York on Sunday evening.

If the real objective is not to give the invasion pledge at this time, I think it would be best to break off the negotiations over an agreement on the interpretation of the contract, rather than by insisting on the right to continue over-flights which were not contemplated by the contract. I think we can make a strong case for insisting, in accordance with your letter of October 27, on safeguards in the form of UN observers at the ports, airfields and so forth in Cuba. I submitted exact language on this several days ago, but I don't have it at hand. To break off over their refusal to give us what we are reasonably entitled to under the agreement would be better than breaking off over their refusal to tolerate over-flights, which were not contemplated by the agreement.

If, on the other hand, our objective is to try to give the guarantee against invasion -- and I hope that is our intention, as a matter of good faith! -- then I think the best approach is language such as we suggested today, declaring our intention of employing other means of observation as may be necessary.

A third possibility is to demand the full safeguards by UN observers, and then when they finally concede that Cuba won't tolerate it, tell them without publicity that we will have to continue the over-flights in self-protection but won't include them in our declaration in the Security Council. There our reliance would have to be on Russia's promise not to reintroduce the weapons.

The President,
The White House.

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I would like to emphasize again what I have said before, namely that if we don't give the invasion pledge after their substantial performance, we are vulnerable not only to criticism from others but may seriously impair the prospects for broader détente. In the course of our negotiations, we have detected repeated indications of Soviet anxiety in that direction and I should hate to see the possibilities diminished, especially by what might appear to some, at least, a capricious attitude on the part of the United States.

Sincerely yours,



Adlai E. Stevenson